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THE SUPREME COURT, r983 TERM
speech as the basis of the freedom of association, but considered that
freedom, once derived, without referring back to the underlying guar-
antee. In those cases, the Court measured the infringement of the
right in terms of the impact on the membership itself.5 9 In Jaycees,
the Court indicated that it is the interference with speech, not with
membership, that must be justified. In the future, therefore, organi-
zations seeking protection under the freedom of expressive association
must argue that challenged regulations interfere with their expression,
not simply with their association.
Jaycees announces a test for associational rights that is responsive
to the states' interest in promoting equality. The Court recognized
that in order to eradicate discrimination, the states must have the
authority to ensure equal access to a broad range of tangible and
intangible goods and services. Although the Court's analysis limits
the freedom of association by casting it solely in instrumental terms,
the test should facilitate protection of that freedom as it is now de-
fined. Jaycees thus embodies a satisfactory compromise between pre-
venting the harms of discrimination and protecting both intimate and
expressive association.
2. Restrictions on Public Broadcasters' Rights To Editorialize. -
Broadcasting occupies a special status under the first amendment: the
Supreme Court has often approved regulation of broadcasting that
would summarily be deemed unconstitutional if applied to other modes
of expression.' The Court has approved such regulation on the ground
that the physical scarcity of broadcasting frequencies limits access to
them and that only by regulating that access can government ensure
that broadcasting will function as a forum for the vigorous discussion
of public issues. 2 Last Term, the Court considered a first amendment
challenge to a broadcasting regulation in FCC v. League of Women
Voters.3 The Court's analysis provides some insight into how far the
Justices are prepared to go in adapting constitutional doctrine not just
to physical realities, but to the realities of the modern regulatory state
as well. The Court acknowledged that the first amendment sometimes
requires both government regulation of communications media and
restrictions on how Congress may distribute its funds. League of
Women Voters suggests, however, that the Court may choose to avoid
59 See Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (I96O); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 5x6, 522-24 (i96o); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
Compare, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (i969) (upholding FCC
regulation giving right of reply to those personally attacked by a broadcaster), with, e.g., Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down state law giving right of
reply to those personally attacked by a newspaper).
2 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 31o6, 3116 (1984).
3 104 S. Ct. 31o6 (1984).
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deciding whether economic limitations on access to the means of
expression - like physical and political limitations - may justify
modifying constitutional doctrine.
The plaintiffs in this case were Pacifica Foundation, a nonprofit,
educational broadcasting corporation, the League of Women Voters,
and Henry Waxman, a congressman and "regular listener and viewer
of public broadcasting."4 They asserted that section 399 of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967, s which prohibited editorializing by any
public broadcasting station 6 that received a grant from the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting (CPB),7 violated their freedoms of speech
and press under the first amendment. 8 The District Court for the
Central District of California, declaring that section 399 violated the
first amendment, granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
and enjoined section 399's enforcement. 9 The government appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.' 0
4 Id. at 3112 n.6. The district court found that Pacifica had standing to challenge the
regulation. See League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 383 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
The court therefore declined to discuss the standing of the League of Women Voters or of Rep.
Waxman.
5 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (Supp. V 1981).
6 The FCC has interpreted this restriction to prevent only "the use of noncommercial
educational broadcast facilities by licensees, their management or those speaking on their behalf
for the propagation of the licensees' own views on public issues [and not] any other presentations
on controversial issues of public importance." In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297,
302 (1973).
7 The Corporation for Public Broadcasting is a private, nonprofit corporation created by
Congress that distributes funds for the construction and operation of local public broadcasting
facilities as well as for the production of educational programming for national distribution.
See 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. V i98I).
8 The plaintiffs also claimed that § 399 violated their fifth amendment right to equal protec-
tion. Because both the district court and the Supreme Court found the provision unconstitutional
under the first amendment, neither court decided the equal protection issue.
9 League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 388 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
The most interesting aspect of the district court's opinion, and the only one rejected by the
Supreme Court, was its insistence that a balancing approach should not automatically be
substituted for the strict scrutiny traditional in first amendment cases simply because broad-
casting regulation was at issue. The district court found that the unique character of broad-
casting justifies a less stringent first amendment standard only if that special character is related
to the reason for the particular regulation of speech at issue. See id. at 384; see also League of
Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3115 (rejecting the district court's approach). The district court
cited FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), as an example of a case in which the special
character of broadcasting justified a restriction on speech. In that case, the Supreme Court
upheld the FCC's restrictions on the broadcast of "indecent" speech. It reasoned that the unique
accessibility of broadcasting to children and the uselessness of prior warnings in a medium in
which listeners continually tune in and out made it particularly difficult for the state to achieve
in any less restrictive way the admittedly legitimate state interest in protecting children from
such speech. See id. at 748-50. The district court in League of Women Voters found no
comparable connection between the scarce character of broadcasting frequencies and the regu-
lation of speech at issue in this case. See 547 F. Supp. at 384; Brief for Appellees League of
Women Voters at 2o n.28, FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 31o6 (1984) (No. 82-
912).
10 The appeal was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), which allows direct review
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A closely divided Court affirmed. Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority,' acknowledged that a special first amendment standard
applies to broadcasting. "[B]ecause broadcast regulation involves
unique considerations," he wrote, "our cases have not followed pre-
cisely the same approach that we have applied to other media and
have never gone so far as to demand that such regulations serve
'compelling' governmental interests."' 12 The Court based its more
lenient approach to the regulation of broadcasting on the "fundamental
distinguishing characteristic of the new medium . . . [,which] is that
'[b]roadcasting frequencies are a scarce resource [that] must be por-
tioned out among applicants."'' 13 Because not everyone who wishes
to broadcast can do so, the Court observed, broadcasters act, in part,
as public trustees.14 As trustees, they are charged with fostering the
first amendment's ideal of "'an uninhibited marketplace of ideas ' "
5
by ensuring that the audience has access to a wide range of viewpoints
and voices. 16
The role of broadcasters as trustees does not, however, deprive
them completely of the protection of the first amendment. The League
of Women Voters opinion emphasized that broadcasters are "'entitled
under the First Amendment to exercise "the widest journalistic free-
dom consistent with their public [duties].",""17 Accordingly, the Court
articulated a standard designed to balance the public's first amend-
ment interest in robust debate against the broadcasters' first amend-
ment right to journalistic discretion: any restriction on broadcasters'
speech must be "narrowly tailored to further a substantial govern-
mental interest." 18
by the Supreme Court of any final district court judgment declaring an act of Congress uncon-
stitutional. See League of Women Voters, IO4 S. Ct. at 3114 & n.io.
11 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined the majority opinion.
12 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3io6, 3115 (1984); see Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
13 104 S. Ct. at 3116 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 101 (I973)). In the Red Lion case, the Court explained why this scarcity requires
different treatment: "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." 395 U.S. at
388.
14 104 S. Ct. at 3116; see Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981).
15 104 S. Ct. at 3116 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390).
16 See id.
17 Id. at 3116-17 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (I98I)
(quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, i10 (1973))).
For suggestions about the source of a first amendment right to journalistic discretion, see
Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 235 & n.67
(finding such a right implied by the framers' inclusion of a press as well as speech clause), and
Blasi, "Journalistic Autonomy" as a First Amendment Concept, in IN HONOR OF JUSTICE
DOUGLAS 55, 68 (R. Keller, Jr., ed. 1977) (deriving such a right from the function of the press
as a check on government).
18 104 S. Ct. at 31x8.
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In applying this standard to section 399's ban on editorializing,
the majority began with a discussion of the seriousness of the ban's
interference with broadcasters' first amendment rights. The Court
found the interference significant in two respects. First, the "expres-
sion of editorial opinion," which the statute proscribed, "lies at the
heart of First Amendment protection" 19 because of the important role
such expression plays in the democratic process. 20 Second, the regu-
lation at issue limited speech on the basis of its "content" 21 and was
therefore particularly suspect.
22
The Court next considered whether the two interests asserted by
the government could justify section 399.23 First, the FCC had ar-
gued, the restriction prevented the stations from using their editorials
to air pro-government propaganda in order to protect their federal
funding. 24 Second, section 399 prevented licensees from editorializing
in favor of private, partisan views. 25 The Court did not find either
of these purposes persuasive. The majority saw the threat of undue
government influence over editorial policy as speculative and insub-
stantial. 26 And, even assuming the danger to be real, the Court
believed section 399 to be a poorly designed remedy, one that was
both over- and underinclusive. 27 The second asserted danger - that
public broadcasters' editorials would become a tool of private, partisan
19 Id.
20 See id. at 3118-19; see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1966) (striking down
law prohibiting newspapers from publishing election-day editorials telling people how to vote).
The FCC has itself acknowledged the public interest in editorials by defining editorializing as
one of the major elements of programming necessary for a station to serve the public interest.
See 104 S. Ct. at 3ii9 n.14 (citing FCC Programming Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7295 (1q6o)).
21 Not all speech by a broadcaster was considered editorializing; only an expression of
opinion on "controversial issues of public importance" fell within the ban. See 104 S. Ct. at
3119 (quoting In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973)). The challenged
statute prohibited a particular group of people - public broadcasters receiving CPB funds -
from speaking on a particular subject - their own opinions on public issues. It therefore
constituted a regulation of content.
22 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978).
23 The provision's legislative history indicated that one of Congress's motives may have been
the illegitimate desire to limit criticism of political officials by public broadcasters. See 104 S.
Ct. at 3121 n.i8; Lindsey, Public Broadcasting: Editorial Restraints and the First Amendnent,
28 FED. COM. B.J. 63, 94-96 (I975).
24 See Brief for the United States at 22-28, 35-39, League of Women Voters (No. 82-912).
25 Such partisan advocacy, the government had contended, would destroy the unbiased
presentation that was the goal of the funding and would put taxpayers in the position of
supporting private speech with which they disagreed. See id. at 25-28, 33-35, 39.
26 The Court pointed out that CPB funds represent a relatively small percentage of the total
funding for public broadcasting, see 104 S. Ct. at 3123 n.ig, and that the Public Broadcasting
Act contains many more effective and less restrictive measures to ensure that the funding
mechanism would not become a means of government control over editorial policy, see id. at
3122-23. Moreover, the Court believed local stations' editorials to be one of the least likely
targets of government control. See id. at 3123-24.
27 The provision was overinclusive in that it banned many editorials unrelated to subjects
in which the government would take a serious interest. It was underinclusive in that government
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interests - fared no better. The Court found that section 399 was
ill-suited to prevent this harm as compared with other available
means.2 8 Thus, the government failed to meet its burden of showing
that section 399 was narrowly drafted to serve a substantial state
interest. 29
Finally, the Court considered and rejected the government's ar-
gument that the challenged regulation fell within Congress's spending
power. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,30 the Court had
allowed Congress to deny preferred tax-exempt status to organizations
that engage in substantial lobbying so that Congress could prevent
those organizations from using the funds to subsidize the exercise of
the protected right to lobby.3 1 In League of Women Voters, the FCC
argued that the Court should, likewise, uphold section 399 as the
expression of Congress's intention not to subsidize editorializing by
public broadcasters. 32 But the Court rejected this argument. Relying
primarily on the reasoning of the concurrence in Taxation With Rep-
resentation,33 the Court pointed out that the government in that case
had allowed the subsidized organizations to lobby without forfeiting
their tax exemption: they could continue to receive federal aid as long
as they segregated their public and private funds to ensure that the
subsidy did not support the lobbying. In League of Women Voters,
however, section 399 prohibited a station from editorializing even if
none of the funds obtained from CPB were used to support that
activity. As a result, the broadcasters were unconstitutionally forced
to choose between their federal funding and their first amendment
right to speak. 3 4
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White, 3 5 took issue with the majority's dismissal of the argu-
influence can be exerted through many other aspects of broadcasting besides editorializing. See
id. at 3124.
28 Section 399 is too limited to prevent an insidious bias from coloring all of a station's
programming. The fairness doctrine, which requires all broadcasters to present public issues in
a balanced manner and applies to all forms of programming, is a better means of preventing
this harm. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 377 (1969); In re
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249-51 (1949). The fairness doctrine
is preferable because it prevents a partisan presentation of public issues without silencing the
broadcaster. See League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3126-27.
29 See 104 S. Ct. at 3127.
30 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
31 See id. at 2003.
32 See Brief for the United States at 43-46, League of Women Voters (No. 82-912).
33 See 104 S. Ct. at 3128 (citing Taxation With Representation, 103 S. Ct. at 2004-05
(Blackmun, J., concurring)); id. at 3131 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting majority's reliance
on the Taxation With Representation concurrence).
34 See 104 S. Ct. at 3228.
35 See id. at 3129-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White also filed a separate one-
sentence dissent based on considerations unrelated to the majority's analysis. See id. at 3232
(White, J., dissenting).
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ment that section 399 was a legitimate exercise of the government's
spending power. He contended that the majority was economically
naive in assuming that it was possible to segregate the funds for public
broadcasting so that federal money would not subsidize editorializing.
Because "CPB's unrestricted grants are used for salaries, training,
equipment, promotion, etc. - financial expenditures which benefit all
aspects of a station's programming, including management's
editorials",36 - the government could avoid subsidizing editorials only
by prohibiting them or by abandoning general funding. 37 The first
option - prohibition - met Justice Rehnquist's standard for a con-
stitutional condition on the use of federal funds:38 it was a neutral
ban39 that operated to prevent a subsidy of the protected activity
rather than to penalize it by withdrawing some unrelated benefit. 40
As such a condition, section 399 implicated no constitutional rights
and was subject only to the weak requirement that it be rationally
related to a legitimate state end. Justice Rehnquist, finding this stan-
dard met,41 concluded that the section was constitutional. 42
A third dissent, by Justice Stevens, argued that the Court gave too little credence to the
FCC's asserted interest in protecting broadcasters from government influence over their editorial
policies. Believing that Congress was a better judge of this political danger than the Court
was, and that Congress's assessment was valid, Justice Stevens found that the restriction served
a government purpose of "overriding importance." Id. at 3136-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
Justice Stevens's opinion, moreover, § 399 did not significantly interfere with free speech: the
ban left broadcasters free to express their opinions through avenues other than their subsidized
stations, allowed other commentators to express their opinions on the stations, and was com-
pletely neutral with respect to the subject matter addressed and the viewpoint presented. Sec
id. at 3134-35.
36 Id. at 3131 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37 Cf. Reply Brief for the FCC at 2o, League of Women Voters (No. 82-912) (if government
may not prohibit editorializing, it will be forced "to choose between abandoning assistance for
public broadcasting and subsidizing editorializing by those groups or persons who happen to
have control of public stations"). The majority rejected this argument on the ground that
Congress could have enabled a station to segregate its funds so that no federal aid subsidized
editorializing. See 104 S. Ct. at 3128. Thus, the holding in League of Women Voters is limited
to situations in which funding can be effectively segregated. The Court leaves open the question
whether Congress could force a recipient to choose between retaining its funding and exercising
its rights in a case - if there is one - in which that was the only way to prevent the subsidy
short of abandoning funding.
38 A long line of cases restricts the government's ability to condition receipt of a government
benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) (holding that requirement that veterans take a loyalty oath in order to qualify for a
property tax exemption unconstitutionally restricts their freedom of speech). See generally Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. i595 (196o) (discussing the arguments that
justify this restriction on the government's ability to put conditions on its benefits).
39 See 104 S. Ct. at 3132 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Like Justice Stevens, see supra note
35, Justice Rehnquist found the ban neutral with respect to both the viewpoint presented and
the content or subject matter addressed. See 104 S. Ct. at 3132 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As
the majority pointed out, however, editorializing is a particular type of speech identifiable by
its content: the expression of opinion on an issue of public interest. See supra note 2 .
40 See 104 S. Ct. at 3132 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41 See id.
42 See id.
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The League of Women Voters opinions illuminate the Court's as-
sumptions about the nature of the society in which the first amend-
ment operates, and indicate how far the Court will modify first amend-
ment doctrine in light of those assumptions. First amendment
jurisprudence was founded on a conception of American society as a
"marketplace of ideas" - a society characterized by its members'
relative equality of access to the means of speech, by freedom from
government regulation, and by the vigorous exchange of diverse view-
points resulting from this combination of unimpeded access and un-
restricted expression. 43 But in the broadcasting context, the Court
has asserted, the physical scarcity of frequencies makes it impossible
to achieve equal access and diversified debate without abandoning the
laissez-faire approach. 44 Therefore, the Court has upheld government'
regulation of broadcasting as long as it serves the goals of broader
access and more balanced presentation without unnecessarily restrict-
ing expression. 45
The regulation at issue in League of Women Voters did not serve
those goals. As the appellees pointed out: "[T]o silence the broadcaster
in order to eliminate the theoretical possibility of government inter-
ference with the content of its programming stands the First Amend-
ment on its head. The remedy for any feared imbalance in the mar-
ketplace of ideas is more speech, not less speech."' 46 The Court
recognized that the regulation seriously intruded on broadcasters' free-
dom of expression. 47 Moreover, the regulation did not further the
public's interests in diversified debate and equality of access; in the
name of "a balanced presentation," it deprived listeners of broadcast-
ers' knowledgeable and articulate opinions on public issues48 rather
43 See Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1642-43 (1967). For the view that the marketplace of ideas is a by-product - neither
required nor necessarily desirable - of the more fundamental first amendment purpose of
preventing government suppression of speech, see Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in
the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. I, io-
IX (i973).
44 See League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3116; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 902 (1963) ("The situation is indeed paradoxical. Freedom of expression is by
its very nature laissez-faire; it implies absence of government control. Yet the conditions under
which freedom of expression can successfully operate in modern society require more and more
governmental regulation.").
45 See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (i981) (upholding statutory
right of access for federal candidates); cf. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3118 (stating
that broadcast regulation must be "narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental
interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of public issues").
46 Brief for Appellees League of Women Voters at 12, League of Women Voters (No. 82-912);
see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978).
47 See 104 S. Ct. at 3118-2o. This was a particularly invidious "content" regulation because
it singled out the dimension of broadcasters' speech that is most clearly connected to the role of
speech as an outlet for self-expression: their opinions.
48 See Lindsey, supra note 23, at 96.
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than simply ensuring access, within the limits of spectrum scarcity, to
those with different points of view.49
Although the result in League of Women Voters is thus unsurpris-
ing, the analysis warrants closer examination. The Court's approach
indicates the extent to which it is willing to adapt constitutional
doctrine to the technological and economic conditions that distinguish
the modern regulatory state from the proverbial marketplace of ideas.
The Court's dismissal of the argument that section 399 is within
Congress's spending power, as that power was interpreted in Taxation
With Representation, demonstrates the Court's willingness to prohibit
the government from using its extensive regulatory apparatus to re-
strict access to the means of speech. In a modern economy charac-
terized by widespread reliance on government benefits and subsidies,
statutory conditions on those benefits that silence a large number of
people may significantly limit the scope and diversity of public debate.
The Court accommodated this widespread reliance on government
funds by denying government the power to distribute those funds in
a way that interferes with recipients' exercise of constitutional rights.
The Court's desire to cabin the growth of the regulatory state may
also shed light on its curious refusal to reconsider whether broadcast-
ing outlets remain truly scarce. The Court has clung to the notion
that access to broadcasting is chiefly impeded by a physical barrier,
the finite spectrum of broadcasting frequencies, and has refrained from
acknowledging the fundamental economic barriers to access. Perhaps
the Court fears that such an acknowledgment - a recognition that
economic concentration in the broadcasting industry, caused by un-
derlying market forces, is what limits many people's opportunities to
speak - could constitutionally justify, or even require, extensive gov-
ernmental regulation of communications media in the interest of re-
vitalizing the marketplace of ideas.
Justice Brennan's discussion of Taxation With Representation
seems to indicate that a majority of the Court has adopted the rea-
soning of the concurrence in that case50 and embraced the view that
the distinguishing characteristic of an unconstitutional scheme is its
implicit demand that the would-be recipient choose between his fund-
ing and his rights. By affirming this view, the majority implies that
the holding in Taxation With Representation - that Congress may
condition federal aid to avoid subsidizing the exercise of a constitu-
49 See iO4 S. Ct. at 3121 (distinguishing § 399 from regulations increasing access); supra
note 28.
50 Compare League of Women Voters, io4 S. Ct at 3128 (arguing that Congress may prohibit
the use of public funds for protected activity only if it allows the recipient to continue to engage
in protected activity using his own funds), and Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 103 S.
Ct. 1997, 2004-05 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (same) with Taxation With Representation,
203 S. Ct. at 2001 (arguing that Congress may prohibit the use of public funds for protected
activity because it is not required to subsidize constitutional rights).
[Vol. 98:87
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tional right - applies only to statutes that allow the recipient of aid
to continue exercising that right as long as he does not use Congress's
funds for that purpose.
The majority opinion in Taxation With Representation, which
Justice Rehnquist wrote, did not rely primarily on the recipient's
opportunity to keep both his funding and his rights.5 ' Instead, the
opinion focused on the government's power to tailor its spending
program to further only its chosen objectives and on the plaintiff's
legal inability to demand that those objectives include subsidization
of constitutional rights. 52 This focus might be consistent with robust
public debate if we lived in the society envisioned by early first
amendment jurisprudence: if government subsidies were insubstantial
- in terms of both the number of people who receive them and the
degree to which any individual relies upon them - then an attempt
by Congress to silence the recipients through withdrawal of funds
would have a negligible impact on the range of voices and viewpoints
available to the public.
In a society, however, in which government funding is often a
prerequisite to private activity,53 the majority's position may be es-
sential to ensuring each citizen a meaningful opportunity to exercise
his rights and contribute to public debate. Although Congress could
have constitutionally chosen not to fund private activity at all, it has
chosen instead to create an extensive web of federal aid, thereby
inviting widespread reliance on public funds. If the Court now al-
lowed Congress to condition its subsidies on the recipients' relinquish-
ing their first amendment rights, there would remain few people who
could afford to speak. 54 In requiring that government allow the re-
cipients of its aid to retain their rights, the Court implicitly modifies
its traditional first amendment vision by acknowledging that govern-
ment intervention is a fact of modern life. Yet the Court's modified
position remains true to one of the hallmarks of the traditional vision:
the judiciary's limitation of government interference with expressive
activity.
An examination of the Court's staunch refusal to recognize the
demise of spectrum scarcity55 underscores the conflict between the
Court's continuing desire to limit government and its responsibility to
s1 See League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3131 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52 See Taxation With Representation, 1o3 S. Ct. at 2000-01, 2003.
53 See Brief for Appellees League of Women Voters at 27, League of Women Voters (No. 82-
912) ("Congress today funds everything from education to elections, from parks to playhouses.
If the existence of such support were deemed sufficient to justify restricting the recipients'
freedom of speech, the First Amendment would soon become meaningless.").
54 Most people would be unable to bear the loss of the subsidy and also unable, once denied
the funding, to compete with those more willing to forgo the exercise of their constitutional
rights.
55 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 & n.25 (1969).
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protect freedom of expression. In League of Women Voters, the Court
explicitly refused to determine whether, as a factual matter, spectrum
scarcity still exists; it thrust that task upon Congress and the FCC. 56
This abdication of its constitutional responsibility may result, at least
in part, from the Court's desire to avoid the choice it would then face.
If it finally accepts its responsibility, and acknowledges the end of
spectrum scarcity - a fact generally recognized by commentators5 7
- the Court could choose to release broadcasting from its second-
class first amendment status in either of two ways. On the one hand,
the Court could simply welcome broadcasting into the fold of tradi-
tional first amendment protection and initiate the dismantling of the
regulatory system.5 8 Yet, having disavowed spectrum scarcity, the
Court would still have to contend with the uncomfortable fact that
limitations on access persist. These limitations are caused not by the
physical restriction of spectrum scarcity or by political restrictions
imposed by Congress, but by economic constraints that perpetuate the
concentration of control in the broadcasting industry.5 9 If it recog-
56 League of Women Voters takes the Court's refusal to address the issue of spectrum scarcity
one step further: it attempts to thrust the responsibility for the evaluation of spectrum scarcity
upon the political branches. The Court explicitly declined to "reconsider [its] long-standing
approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have
advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." 104
S. Ct. at 3116 n.ii. If spectrum scarcity has disappeared, broadcasting is now constitutionally
indistinguishable from the more traditional forms of the press. See Bazelon, supra note 17, at
220-26; Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regu-
lation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1976). The existing regulatory scheme,
which has never been acceptable in other first amendment contexts, see League of Women
Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3115-16, might then appear to be a massive invasion of broadcasters'
rights. The Court may not rely upon Congress or an agency to notify it that circumstances
have changed in such a way that a constitutional violation has arisen. It must itself make any
factual judgments necessary to determine the constitutional validity of a regulatory scheme.
This is not to say that the Court must make an independent assessment of every factual
judgment; clearly some judgments are within the discretion of the political branches. But the
only judgments that are within the legislature's or executive's sole discretion are those that will
not result in the violation of anyone's rights regardless of the decision. In cases in which a
factual matter is itself the condition precedent of a constitutional right, the Court fails to fulfill
its duty to uphold the Constitution if it simply accepts the legislature's or executive's determi-
nation and refuses to assess the situation independently. See id. at 3122 n.x8 ("'[D]eference to
a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.
... Were it otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to
legislative definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power
would be nullified.'" (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-
44 (1978))).
57 See, e.g., I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 151-56 (1983); Bazelon, supra note 17,
at 223; Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 6o TEX. L. REV.
207, 221-26 (1982).
58 Cf. Note, Concepts of the Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation
and a Proposal, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83, 105-o6 (1972) (suggesting that commercial broadcasters
should be treated like the publishing press).
S9 See Bazelon, supra note 17, at 238; Note, supra note 58, at 1o5 n.ios. The vast
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nized these economic limitations, the Court might then choose the
second alternative: to acknowledge that economic barriers, like phys-
ical and political ones, may justify adapting constitutional doctrine to
serve the goal of broader access.
Perhaps because its opposition to political barriers was motivated,
at least in part, by a distrust of government, the Court has been
unwilling to extend its arguments to oppose economic barriers to
access. This unwillingness exalts the means over the end: it trans-
forms the special wariness of government encroachment - which
should act merely as an aid in identifying and eliminating politically
created barriers to speech - into a justification for ignoring econom-
ically created barriers. If the Court would recall that a diverse and
robust marketplace of ideas is the goal of the first amendment, it
might recognize that limited access, whatever its cause, justifies the
government's efforts to create an opportunity for other voices and
points of view to be heard.
The Court may also be reluctant to follow this approach because
of the possibility of its application to other media. As the Court itself
recognized a decade ago, inaccessibility is a problem in the print media
as well:
The elimination of competing newspapers in most of our large cities,
and the concentration of control of media that results from the only
newspaper's being owned by the same interests which own a television
station and a radio station, are important components of this trend
toward concentration of control of outlets to inform the public.
The result of these vast changes has been to place in a few hands
the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion. 60
Once the Court recognizes that the concentration of power allows, or
perhaps even requires, 61 the government to take affirmative steps to
provide access to those outside the communications industry, it is
difficult to see how the print media could escape access regulation as
well. 62
concentrations of wealth and the consequent loss of equal opportunity that result from the
general operation of capitalism have replaced the traditional "free market" in speech with a
limited-access market that must be regulated if it is to serve the purposes of the first amendment.
60 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50 (I974) (footnote omitted).
In Miami Herald, the Court rejected a statutory guarantee of access despite its recognition of
the concentration problem. See id. at 254. It has, however, upheld the FCC's efforts to reduce,
through broadcasting regulation, the concentration of media control. See, e.g., FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (holding that FCC may refuse broad-
casting licenses to those with significant control over other local mass media).
61 If the public truly has a first amendment right to a broad-based forum, the regulation
necessary to achieve such a forum may be constitutionally required.
62 For suggestions on how to limit the reach of the access principle, see Bollinger, supra
note 56, at 26-37, and Note, supra note s8, at io6-og. For a collection of sources on the access
theory, see Lange, supra note 43, at 2 n.5 (supporting the theory), and id. at 5 n.21 (criticizing
the theory).
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In its treatment of broadcasting, the Court faces the difficult task
of interpreting constitutional values in light of a modern society per-
meated by government regulation and subsidization. League of
Women Voters, by rejecting the suggestion of unbridled congressional
discretion implicit in Justice Rehnquist's dissent, reaffirms the Court's
commitment to that project. The Court's refusal to recognize the
disappearance of spectrum scarcity is, however, an abdication of its
duty of constitutional interpretation. If it chooses to recognize that
physical scarcity is now no more than a myth, the Court will find
itself in possession of a valuable opportunity to adapt constitutional
law to economic reality. The special status of broadcasting might then
be seen not as an aberration, but as the foundation of a first amend-
ment theory that addresses the economic phenomenon of a modern
communications industry that excludes most Americans from the pub-
lic debate on which democracy depends.
3. Symbolic Speech. - For decades, the Supreme Court has strug-
gled to reconcile "the right to disseminate ideas in public places" with
"claims of an effective power in government to keep the peace and to
protect other interests of a civilized community." 1 In resolving this
tension in individual cases, the Court has largely managed to accom-
modate first amendment interests while giving due deference to the
regulatory judgments of government. The particular needs and values
associated with the form of expression at stake have been carefully
weighed against the governmental purpose in restricting the expres-
sion, discounted by the availability of effective alternatives for fur-
thering that purpose. Last Term, however, in Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence,2 the Court abandoned this sensitive bal-
ancing of interests and mechanically upheld the application of a gov-
ernment regulation that impaired expressive activity in a traditional
public forum, yet advanced a governmental purpose only roughly.
In 1982, the Community for Creative Nonviolence (CCNV), a
religious association formed to work on behalf of homeless people,
received from the National Park Service a renewable seven-day permit
to conduct a round-the-clock demonstration in Washington, D.C. 3
The demonstration, scheduled to begin on the first day of winter, was
to consist of the occupation by 15o homeless persons of two "symbolic
tent cities" - one in Lafayette Park across from the White House,
and the other on the Mall abutting the Washington Monument. 4 The
I Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273-74 (i95i) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result).
2 104 S. Ct. 3o65 (1984).
3 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (plurality opinion).
4 CCNV, 2O4 S. Ct. at 3o68. Demonstrations are quite common in these parks, but are
ordinarily subject to permits issued by the National Park Service. See 36 C.F.R. § 50.19 (1983).
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